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Abstract The theory of designing block ciphers is mature, having seen significant
progress since the early 1990s for over two decades, especially during the AES devel-
opment effort. Nevertheless, interesting directions exist, in particular in the study of
the provable security of block ciphers along similar veins as public-key primitives, i.e.
the notion of pseudorandomness (PRP) and indistinguishability (IND). Furthermore,
recent cryptanalytic progress has shown that block ciphers well designed against known
cryptanalysis techniques including related-key attacks (RKA) may turn out to be less
secure against related-key attacks than expected. The notion of provable security of
block ciphers against related-key attacks was initiated by Bellare and Kohno, and sub-
sequently treated by Lucks. Concrete block cipher constructions were proposed therein
with provable security guarantees. In this paper, we are interested in the security no-
tions for RKA-secure block ciphers.
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2In the first part of the paper, we show that secure tweakable permutation families in
the sense of strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP) can be transformed into secure
permutation families in the sense of SPRP against some classes of related-key attacks
(SPRP-RKA). This fact allows us to construct a secure SPRP-RKA cipher which is
faster than the Bellare-Kohno PRP-RKA cipher. We also show that function families of
a certain form secure in the sense of a pseudorandom function (PRF) can be transformed
into secure permutation families in the sense of PRP against some classes of related-key
attacks (PRP-RKA). We can exploit it to get various constructions secure against some
classes of related-key attacks from known MAC algorithms. Furthermore, we discuss
how the key recovery (KR) security of the Bellare-Kohno PRP-RKA, the Lucks PRP-
RKA and our SPRP-RKA ciphers relates to existing types of attacks on block ciphers
like meet-in-the-middle and slide attacks.
In the second part of the paper, we define other security notions for RKA-secure
block ciphers, namely in the sense of indistinguishability and non-malleability, and show
the relations between these security notions. In particular, we show that secure tweak-
able permutation families in the sense of indistinguishability (resp. non-malleability)
can be transformed into RKA-secure permutation families in the sense of indistinguisha-
bility (resp. non-malleability).
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Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 94A60
1 Introduction
The design and analysis of block ciphers is an established field of study which has seen
significant progress especially for the past 2 decades. While numerous cryptanalytic
results and techniques have been discovered, what remains on an interesting direction
to explore is the theoretical study of provable security for block ciphers. Some work
in this direction includes those initiated by Luby and Rackoff [28] which treated the
pseudorandomness of Feistel cipher constructions, and by Vaudenay [36] which consid-
ered some form of provable security against known types of block cipher attacks like
differential and linear cryptanalysis.
In 1992 and 1993, Knudsen [25] and Biham [4] independently introduced a crypt-
analytic technique which exploits related keys in a differential attack. This so-called
related-key attack (RKA) has widely been used to evaluate the security of block ciphers
[4,18–20,26]. The related-key differential attack has also been extended into various
cryptanalytic techniques such as a related-key differential-linear attack [15], a related-
key impossible differential attack [18], a related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks
[5,22]. Related-key attacks are well-known to be powerful tools to analyze block ci-
phers: up to now, the best known attacks (in terms of the number of attacked rounds)
against AES [24], KASUMI [6], IDEA [7], SHACAL-1 [8] and GOST [26] are all related-
key attacks. Furthermore, related-key attacks can be used to evaluate the security of
message authentication codes and block cipher based enciphering modes (refer to [3]
for an example).
Related-key attacks allow an adversary to obtain plaintext and ciphertext pairs by
using different but related keys which are unknown to the adversary. Such attacks are
commonly exploited to mount a key-recovery attack on the block cipher, i.e. retrieve
some or all portions of the related keys by using collected plaintext and ciphertext pairs;
3the success or failure of these attacks is determined by whether or not the adversary
can distinguish the underlying cipher from a random permutation family with the same
key space and plaintext/ciphertext space as those of the underlying cipher (sometimes
we refer to a permutation family as a cipher). Hence, from a theoretical point of
view, the distinguishing ability of the most powerful related-key adversary determines
the security of the underlying cipher against related-key attacks. More precisely, if a
cipher E (resp. E,E−1) and a randomly chosen permutation family G (resp. G,G−1)
are indistinguishable under related-key attack models, we then say that E is secure
in the sense of a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) (resp. a strong pseudorandom
permutation (SPRP)) against related-key attacks (RKA); simply, we say that E is a
secure PRP-RKA (resp. SPRP-RKA) cipher.
Compared to cryptanalytic results on related-key attacks there are few theoretical
results on them. In 2003, Bellare and Kohno [3] first initiated a theoretical investigation
of security against related-key attacks. They defined a general model of related-key
attacks, i.e., classes of related-key attacks which are specified by an associated set of
key transformations, together with some security notions for these attacks including
PRP-RKA, SPRP-RKA and PRF-RKA. They also clarified what classes of these attacks
do or do not allow to achieve security against them (note that for any normal ciphers
there exist classes of related-key attacks against which they are always insecure: for
instance, if a ciphertext generated from a plaintext P and a key K is equal to that
generated from the same plaintext and its related key K′ = K|a where a is a bit-string
whose bits are all 0 except for the i-th position and | is the bitwise-or, then the i-th
bit of the key should be 1 with a high probability [3] – if the i-th bit of the key K is 0,
then K 6= K′). They also gave a construction of secure PRP-RKA cipher. In [29] Lucks
proposed another construction of secure PRP-RKA cipher that has a better security
bound than that of [3].
The first goal of this paper is to construct various provably secure ciphers against
some classes of related-key attacks from constructions which are already known to be
provably secure. The second goal of this paper is to study how existing block-cipher
cryptanalysis techniques relate to the key recovery (KR) security of these concrete PRP-
RKA secure ciphers. The third goal of the paper is to define various security notions of
RKA-secure block ciphers and to show the relationships among these security notions.
In this paper, more precisely, we show that secure tweakable permutation families
in the sense of SPRP can be transformed into secure permutation families in the sense
of SPRP-RKA (with respect to some classes of related-key attacks); and furthermore
that secure function families of a certain form in the sense of PRF can be transformed
into secure permutation families in the sense of PRP-RKA (with respect to some classes
of related-key attacks). This enables us to construct various SPRP-RKA or PRP-RKA
ciphers from known design methods. We then discuss how1 the KR security of the
Bellare-Kohno PRP-RKA, the Lucks PRP-RKA and our SPRP-RKA ciphers relates to
existing types of attacks on block ciphers, e.g., meet-in-the-middles and slide attacks.
Furthermore, we define other security notions for related-key attacks, indistinguisha-
bility and non-malleability, and look into the relations between these RKA security
notions. At the end of this paper, we show that secure tweakable permutation families
in the sense of indistinguishability (resp. non-malleability) can be transformed to se-
cure permutation families in the sense of indistinguishability (resp. non-malleability)
against some classes of related-key attacks.
1 An extended abstract of this latter work appeared in [35].
4This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some notation and security
notions for related-key attacks and key recovery attacks. In Section 3 and Section 4,
we observe that various secure permutation families against some classes of related-key
attacks can be constructed from schemes which are already known to be secure in the
sense of PRF. Section 5 describes several key recovery attacks on existing PRP-RKA
secure ciphers and relates the corresponding success probability with the security bound
derived from a generic attacker. Section 6 defines various security notions for related-
key attacks and shows the relationships among these security notions and Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some notation and definitions of security notions which are
used throughout the paper. We adopt the notation of [3].
2.1 Notation
– s
$← S : the operation of selecting s uniformly at random from the set S
– F : K×D → R : a family of functions from D to R indexed by keys K, i.e., FK(·)
is a function from D to R for each key K ∈ K
– E : K × D → D : a family of permutations on D indexed by K, i.e., EK(·) is a
permutation on D for each key K ∈ K
– E˜ : K × T × D → D : a family of permutations on D indexed by K × T , i.e.,
E˜K(T, ·) is a permutation on D for each key K ∈ K and tweak T ∈ T (note that
T is an independent second input which is public information rather than a nonce
or initialization vector, but the intent is similar [27].)
– Perm(D) : the set of all permutations on D
– Perm(K,D) : the set of all families of permutations with domain D and keys K
– Rand(D,R) : the set of all functions from D to R
– Rand(K,D,R) : the set of all families of functions with domain D, range R and
keys K
In this paper, we call F a function family. We also call E and E˜ a permutation family
and a tweakable permutation family, respectively. According to the above notation,
G
$← Perm(K,D) represents the selection of a random permutation family, i.e., for
each keyK ∈ K, GK(·) is a permutation randomly chosen from Perm(D). Furthermore,
G
$← Rand(K,D,R) represents the selection of a random function family, i.e., for each
key K ∈ K, GK(·) is a function randomly chosen from Rand(D,R).
2.2 Definitions of Security Notions
Many security notions have been introduced for function and permutation families; in
these notions, an adversary A can black-box access to one or more oracle(s). While the
computational power of A is unlimited, the total number of oracle calls is limited to
a certain number. For each query of A the oracle gives an answer to A. After making
a limited number of queries to the oracle(s) adaptively, A outputs a bit. Sections 3,
54 and 5 consider the following security notions in the sense of pseudorandomness and
key-recovery. Some other security notions will be introduced in Section 6 in the sense
of indistinguishability and non-malleability. In this paper, for any adversary A, we say
the advantage is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial [2].
Definition 1 (PRF) [2] Let F : K × D → R be a function family and A be an
adversary. Then the prf-advantage of A is defined by
AdvprfF (A) = Pr[K
$← K : AFK(·) = 1]− Pr[g $← Rand(D,R) : Ag(·) = 1].
AO(·) means A with an oracle O(·), which returns O(M) for the adversary’s query M .
Thus F is a secure PRF if AdvprfF (A) is negligible for any A.
Definition 2 (SPRP) [31] Let E : K×D → D be a permutation family and A be an
adversary. Then the sprp-advantage of A is defined by
AdvsprpE (A) = Pr[K
$← K : AEK(·),E−1K (·) = 1]− Pr[g $← Perm(D) : Ag(·),g−1(·) = 1].
AO(·),O−1(·) means A with two oracles O(·),O−1(·); for an adversary’s query of M
(resp. C) to the first (resp. second) oracle it returns O(M) (resp. O−1(C)). Thus E is
a secure SPRP if AdvsprpE (A) is negligible for any A.
Definition 3 (TWEAK-SPRP) [13] Let E˜ : K × T × D → D be a tweakable permu-
tation family and A be an adversary. Then the tweak-sprp-advantage of A is defined
by
Advtweak-sprp
E˜
(A) = Pr[K $← K : AE˜K(·,·),E˜−1K (·,·) = 1]
− Pr[G˜ $← Perm(T ,D) : AG˜(·,·),G˜−1(·,·) = 1].
AO˜(·,·),O˜−1(·,·) means A with two oracles O˜(·, ·), O˜−1(·, ·); for an adversary’s query
of (T,M) (resp. (T,C)) to the first (resp. second) oracle it returns O˜(T,M) (resp.
O˜−1(T,C)). Thus E˜ is a secure TWEAK-SPRP if Advtweak−sprp
E˜
(A) is negligible for
any A.
Definition 4 (SPRP-RKA) [3] Let E : K × D → D be a permutation family and Φ
be a set of functions over K. Let A be an adversary that is restricted to queries of the
form (φ, x) in which φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ D. Then the sprp-rka advantage of A is defined by
Advsprp-rkaΦ,E (A) = Pr[K
$← K : AERK(·,K)(·),E
−1
RK(·,K)(·) = 1]
−Pr[K $← K;G $← Perm(K,D) : AGRK(·,K)(·),G
−1
RK(·,K)(·) = 1].
AORK(·)(·),O
−1
RK(·)(·) means A with two oracles ORK(·)(·),O−1RK(·)(·); for an adversary’s
query of (φ,M) (resp. (φ,C)) to the first (resp. second) oracle it returns Oφ(K)(M)
(resp. O−1
φ(K)
(C)).2 Thus E is a secure SPRP-RKA if Advsprp-rkaΦ,E (A) is negligible for
any A.
2 Note that RK(·,K) has a single parameter which is for the query φ where φ ∈ Φ (it follows
that a related key φ(K) is applied in ERK(·,K)(·), i.e., Eφ(K)(·)).
6The PRP, TWEAK-PRP and PRP-RKA security notions are defined by removing
the decryption oracle in Definitions 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
For security against key recovery, a KR adversary A is given a list L of p pairs of
plaintext/ciphertext
L = {〈P1, C1〉, . . . , 〈Pp, Cp〉}
where Ci = EK(Pi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. Depending on the assumed adversarial ability, the
list L could be known plaintext/ciphertext or chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs, where
in the latter kind, the plaintexts in L are chosen to have specific differences between
them [9]. L is typically formed by an oracle implementing EK(·) taking plaintexts as
input and outputting the corresponding ciphertexts.
The goal of A is to find a key Kˆ that is consistent with L, that is, a key such that,
for all 〈Pi, Ci〉 ∈ L, EKˆ(Pi) = Ci.
Definition 5 (KR) [16] Let ConsE(L) denote the set of all keys consistent with L,
where L as previously defined above is a list of p pairs of plaintext/ciphertext accessible
to the adversary. The advantage of KR adversary A is then given by:
AdvkrE (A) = Pr
[
K
$← K;L ← {〈Pi, EK(Pi)〉} : AL = Kˆ ∈ ConsE(L)] .
E is KR-secure if AdvkrE (A) is negligible for any A.
This can be extended to include RKA [38]:
Advkr-rkaΦ,E (A) = Pr
[
K
$← K;L ← {〈Pi, EK(Pi)〉} :
AL,ERK(·,K)(·) = Kˆ ∈ ConsE(L)
]
.
3 Construction of Secure SPRP-RKA Families from Secure Tweakable SPRP
Families
Bellare and Kohno propose a construction method of secure PRP-RKA family (Proposi-
tion 9.1 of [3]). In their security proof there are two ways to complete it: one is a direct
proof which was concretely described in [3], and the other one is an indirect proof, i.e.,
it is based on the relationship between tweakable PRP families and PRP-RKA families
(the second proof was sketched in [3]). In a formal statement, we can naturally extend
this proof sketch into the SPRP security notion.
Theorem 1 (TWEAK-SPRP→SPRP-RKA) Let E˜ : K × T × D → D be a tweakable
permutation family and let E : K × T × D → D be a permutation family defined as
EK||T (M) = E˜K(T,M) where K is a secret key in K, T is either a tweak value in T
of E˜ or a secret key in T of E, and M is a message in D. If E˜ is a secure tweakable
SPRP, then E is a secure SPRP with respect to Φ-restricted RKAs3 if each function φ
in Φ is a partial transformation4 for which there exists a function φ′ : T → T such
3 Φ-restricted RKAs are defined as related-key attacks which perform under the restriction
Φ when choosing a related key.
4 A partial transformation is to transform some part of instances while the rest part remains
unchanged.
7that φ(K,T ) = (K,φ′(T )). Formally, given an SPRP-RKA adversary A attacking E,
we can construct a TWEAK-SPRP adversary BA attacking E˜ such that
Advsprp-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ Advtweak-sprpE˜ (BA)
and BA takes the same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.
Using the above Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 of [27] (an excerpt of this is given in
Appendix A), we can construct a secure SPRP-RKA family. See Proposition 1 for the
details, where a set H of functions with domain T and range D is said to be ²-almost
2-xor universal (²-AXU2) if Prh[h(x)⊕ h(y) = z] ≤ ² for all x, y, z [27].
Proposition 1 (An SPRP-RKA Construction) Let E : K × D → D be a per-
mutation family, let H : T → D be an ²-AXU2 family with ² ≥ 1/|D| and let
E′ : (K × T × H) × D → D be another permutation family defined as E′K,T,h(M) =
EK(M ⊕ h(T )) ⊕ h(T ) where (K,T, h) is a secret key in K × T × H, and M is a
message in D. If E is a secure SPRP and H is ²-AXU2 where ² is negligible, then
E′ is a secure SPRP with respect to Φ-restricted RKAs when each function φ in Φ
is a partial transformation for which there exists a function φ′ : T → T such that
φ(K,T, h) = (K,φ′(T ), h). Formally, given an SPRP-RKA adversary A attacking E′
that queries its oracles with at most q queries, we can construct an SPRP adversary
BA attacking E such that
Advsprp-rkaΦ,E′ (A) ≤ AdvsprpE (BA) + 3²q2
and BA takes the same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.
Note that the ²-AXU2 family H and its domain T are parts of the key space of E′.
A practical impact of Proposition 1 is that if one does not want to lose much time for
rekeying, then the rekeying process can apply T to generate its related key T ′ without
a loss of security for the cipher. Figure 1 compares the construction of Proposition
1 (which we denote here as Construction C) with the previous ones. Constructions
A (the Bellare-Kohno cipher) and B (the Lucks cipher) call the underlying ciphers
twice, while Construction C requires a single call to the underlying cipher and another
single call to the h function which is normally faster than the underlying cipher. Note
that Constructions B and C can store the key generation parts EK1(K2) and h(T )
respectively before the messageM is applied, and thus until these key generation parts
are refreshed with other keys, they both require a single call to the underlying cipher.
As the h function is normally faster than the E cipher, Construction C is expected to
be not slower than the both of Constructions B and C. See Sect. 5 for the concrete
RKA security bounds of Constructions A and B.
Theorem 1 can be also exploited to construct various RKA-secure permutation
families from tweakable enciphering modes which are already known to be secure. The
security of tweakable enciphering modes CMC [13], EME [14], EME∗ [12] is based on
the security of the underlying block ciphers. In CMC, EME, EME∗, if the tweaks of
CMC, EME, EME∗ are modified into parts of keys, then the modified enciphering
modes with fixed-length messages, i.e., the modified permutation families are secure
against any Φ-restricted related-key attack under the assumption that the underly-
ing block ciphers are secure and the functions of Φ only transform the modified key
portions.
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Fig. 1 Comparison of the construction (C) of Proposition 1 and the previous ones (A, B)
In Section 5, we will discuss how known types of attacks can apply and relate to
the key-recovery security bounds for Constructions A, B and C.
4 Construction of Secure PRP-RKA Families from Secure PRF Families of a
Certain Form
This section shows that secure PRF families of a certain form can be transformed into
secure PRP-RKA families. Before showing it, we give a more rigorous bound of the
PRF-RKA/PRP-RKA switching Proposition 8.9 in [3].
Lemma 1 (PRF-RKA/PRP-RKA Switching) Let A be a related-key adversary that
queries its oracle with at most r different key transformations from fixed Φ and at most
q times per transformation. Then
|Pr[ K $← K, G $← Rand(K,D,D) : AGRK(·,K)(·) = 1]
− Pr[K $← K, G′ $← Perm(K,D) : AG
′
RK(·,K)(·) = 1]| ≤ r · q · (q ·min{r,NMΦ} − 1)
2 · |D|
where NMΦ = maxK,K′∈K{|{φ ∈ Φ : φ(K) = K′}|}.
Proof From Proposition 8.9 in [3] we know that
|Pr[ K $← K, G $← Rand(K,D,D) : AGRK(·,K)(·) = 1]
− Pr[K $← K, G′ $← Perm(K,D) : AG′RK(·,K)(·) = 1]| ≤ Prg[D] ,
where Prg[·] represents the probability in the experiment K $← K, G $← Rand(K,
D,D),AGRK(·,K)(·), where g $← G, and g is the probability variable. Let D represent
the event that, for each related-key that A accesses to its oracle (i.e., φ(K) where A
queries (φ,M) to its oracle), there are no collisions in the responses of the oracle for dif-
ferent messages. In [3], Bellare and Kohno showed that Prg[D] ≤ r·q·NMΦ·(q·NMΦ−1)2·|D| .
However, we can give a more rigorous bound for Prg[D].
9Let φ1, φ2, · · · , φr′ , (r′ ≤ r) be transformations in Φ that A queries. Without
loss of generality, we assume that φ1(K) = · · · = φa1(K) = K1, φa1+1(K) = · · · =
φa1+a2(K) = K2, · · · , φa1+···+am−1+1(K) = · · · = φa1+···+am−1+am(K) = Km where
a1 + · · · + am−1 + am = r′ and Kj 6= Kj′ for 1 ≤ j < j′ ≤ m. Since A queries at
most q times per key transformation, for each Ki the probability of a collision in the
output of the oracle on distinct inputs is at most
ai·q·(ai·q−1)
2·|D| (this bound follows from
Proposition A.1 in [2]). Furthermore, each ai is at most min{r′, NMΦ}. Thus Prg[D]
is bounded as follows.
Prg[D] ≤
m∑
i=1
ai · q · (ai · q − 1)
2 · |D| ≤
m∑
i=1
ai · q · (q ·min{r′, NMΦ} − 1)
2 · |D|
≤ r · q · (q ·min{r,NMΦ} − 1)
2 · |D| . ¤
Note that Lemma 1 improves the bound of Bellare and Kohno’s PRF-RKA/PRP-
RKA switching proposition by a factor of approximately NMΦ. Using Lemma 1 we can
easily show Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (PRF→PRP-RKA) let E : K1 × K2 × D → D be a permutation family
on D and let F : K1 × K2 × D → D be a function family defined as FK1(K2||M) =
EK1||K2(M) where K1 is a secret key in K1, K2 is either a secret key in K2 of E
or a message in K2 of F , and M is a message in D. If F is a secure PRF, then
E is a secure PRP with respect to Φ−restricted RKAs if each function φ in Φ is
a partial transformation for which there exists a function φ′ : K2 → K2 such that
φ(K1,K2) = (K1, φ
′(K2)). Formally, given a PRP-RKA adversary A attacking E that
queries its oracle with at most r different key transformations and at most q queries
per transformation, we can construct a PRF adversary BA attacking F such that
Advprp-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ AdvprfF (BA) +
r · q · (q ·min{r,NMΦ} − 1)
2 · |D|
and BA takes the same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.
Proof Let BA be the F adversary that works as follows.
<Adversary BO(·)A >
1. Select K2 at random from K2.
2. Obtain A’s request (φ(= (id, φ′)),M) by running A.
3. Return O(φ′(K2)||M) to A.
4. If A outputs b, then output b. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
When BA is given access to F , A computes E with related keys. So the following
equality holds:
Pr [K1
$← K1 : BFK1 (·)A = 1] =
Pr [(K1,K2)
$← K1 ×K2 : AERK(·,(K1,K2))(·) = 1] .
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When BA is given access to G where G is randomly chosen from Rand(K2×D,D), BA
replies to A using an independently selected random function on D for each φ′(K2).
So the equation
Pr [G
$← Rand(K2 ×D,D) : BG(·)A = 1] =
Pr [(K1,K2)
$← K1 ×K2, G $← Rand(K1 ×K2,D,D) : AGRK(·,(K1,K2))(·) = 1]
holds. Therefore, by using the above two equations and Lemma 1,
Adv prp-rkaΦ,E (A) = Pr[(K1,K2)
$← K1 ×K2 : AERK(·,(K1,K2))(·) = 1]
− Pr[(K1,K2) $← K1 ×K2, G $← Rand(K1 ×K2,D,D) : AGRK(·,(K1,K2))(·) = 1]
+ Pr[(K1,K2)
$← K1 ×K2, G $← Rand(K1 ×K2,D,D) : AGRK(·,(K1,K2))(·) = 1]
− Pr[(K1,K2) $← K1 ×K2, G $← Perm(K1 ×K2,D) : AGRK(·,(K1,K2))(·) = 1]
≤ AdvprfF (BA) +
r · q · (q ·min{r,NMΦ} − 1)
2 · |D| . ¤
Theorem 2 can be exploited to construct various RKA-secure permutation families
from MAC algorithms which are already known to be secure in the sense of PRF. Con-
sider for example OMAC [17] with fixed-length inputs, if all message blocks except for
the first one are modified into parts of keys, then the modified permutation family is
secure against any Φ-restricted related-key attack under the assumption that the un-
derlying block cipher is secure in the sense of PRP and functions in Φ only transform
the modified key portions.
Note. A function family F : K1×K2×D → D may not be a permutation on D with
respect to each element of K1×K2. In this case, Theorem 2 is not applicable. However,
notice that most existing block-cipher based MAC algorithms (function families) can
be converted to permutation function families, because they are constructed based on
permutation families, i.e., block ciphers.
5 Security of Three PRP-RKA Ciphers against Key Recovery
A preliminary extended abstract version of this section appeared in [35]. In [16], it was
shown that the advantage AdvkrE (A) of any KR adversary A mounting a generic attack
depends on the number t of verifications made to the block cipher E (i.e., evaluations
of the form EKi(Mi) for any text Mi and any key Ki of the adversary’s choice), and
on the key bit-length k. More specifically, it was shown that:
AdvkrE (A) ≤ t
2k
+
1
2k − t .
This bounds the advantage of a generic adversary. We see that both terms on the right
side of the inequality remain small as long as t¿ 2k. As t relates to an exhaustive key
search, this means that a generic adversary must exhaust a significant fraction of key
candidates to have a reasonable chance to recover the actual key. This also means that
having an advantage significantly better than by exhaustive search requires exploiting
the specific structure of the block cipher under attack.
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Similarly, in [38], it was shown that the advantage Advkr-rkaΦ,E (A) of any KR-RKA
adversary A mounting a generic related-key attack is bounded by:
Advkr-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ mt
2k
+
1
2k
,
where m is the number of related-key oracle queries to block cipher E. Analogously,
we see that the advantage of a generic adversary remains small as long as mt¿ 2k.
5.1 Construction A
In [3], Bellare and Kohno analyzed a PRP-RKA secure block-cipher based construct
that is essentially a generalization of the 2-key variant of DES-EXE [32] structure (see
Fig. 1-Construction A). In particular, they proved:
Theorem 3 (Bellare-Kohno) Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher.
Let E′ : {0, 1}k+l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be the block cipher defined as
E′K1‖K2(M) = EK1
(
EK1(M)⊕K2
)
where K1 is k bits long and K2 is l bits long. Let Φ be any set of RKD functions
over {0, 1}k+l that modify only K2 and that are independent of K1. Then, for any
adversary A against E′ that queries its related-key oracle with at most r different RKD
transformations and at most q times per transformation, we can construct an adversary
BA against E such that
Advprp-rkaΦ,E′ (A) ≤ AdvprpE (BA) +
16r2q2 + rq′(q′ − 1)
2l+1
and BA makes 2rq oracle queries and runs in the same time as A and q′ is q times the
maximum over all K,K′ ∈ {0, 1}k+l, of the number of φ ∈ Φ mapping K to K′. uunionsq
The result above shows the existence of block ciphers secure against certain classes
of Φ-restricted related-key attacks. PRP-RKA security of the resulting cipher comes
with a restriction that the set of RKD functions Φ defining an RKA adversary only
modifies the second part of the key (i.e., K2). This is a weaker notion of RKA security
compared to previous works [19,20,34] where no such restriction is made.
With DES-EXE like structures, one may wonder if existing attacks [32,11] on DES-
EXE apply to this variant. We answer this in the affirmative. First, we describe a
meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack that does not require related-key queries. Next, we
present a differential RKA that requires slightly less effort.
MITM Attack.
1. Let 〈M,C〉 and 〈M ′, C′〉 be any two pairs of plaintext/ciphertext in L with C =
E′K1‖K2(M) and C
′ = E′K1‖K2(M
′).
2. For each key guess, Kˆ1 ∈ {0, 1}k, do the following.
(a) Evaluate
S1 = EKˆ1
(M)⊕ E
Kˆ1
(M ′) and S2 = E−1Kˆ1 (C)⊕ E
−1
Kˆ1
(C′)
and check whether S1 = S2.
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(b) If so, let Kˆ2 = E
−1
Kˆ1
(C)⊕ E
Kˆ1
(M) and validate the guessed key Kˆ1‖Kˆ2 on all
pairs of L.
3. If the guessed key is validated, return (the consistent key) Kˆ1‖Kˆ2.
If the above MITM adversary tries all possible keys Kˆ1 ∈ {0, 1}k at Step 2, it will win
the key recovery game with probability 1. As a result, the success probability of this
adversary is ρ, the proportion of guessed keys.
Recalling the results in [16], when considering a generic adversary, any block cipher
E′ of key length k + l bits is expected to provide the following security bound:
AdvkrE′(A) ≤ t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l − t ,
where t denotes the number of verifications. A closer look at the proof offered in [16]
shows that if the generic adversary makes verifications with distinct key candidates
then the bound can be sharpened as:
AdvkrE′(A) ≤ t
2k+l
+
1− t
2k+l
2k+l − t =
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
.
If we let t denote the number of times Step 2 in the MITM attack is performed (i.e.,
the number of times distinct key candidates are being manipulated), then the success
probability is given by:
AdvkrE′(MITM) = ρ =
t
2k
.
Interestingly, we observe that
AdvkrE′(MITM) =
t
2k
>
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
,
and so the block-cipher based construct of Fig. 1-A does not give the best possible
security against key recovery. In fact, the effective keyspace is essentially reduced by l
bits.
Differential RKA Attack (DRKA).
1. Let 〈M,C〉 be any pairs of plaintext/ciphertext in L with C = E′K1‖K2(M).
2. Query the related-key oracle with (M,∆) and obtain the pair (M,C′) with C′ =
E′K1‖K2+∆(M).
3. For each key guess, Kˆ1 ∈ {0, 1}k, do the following.
(a) Check whether
E−1
Kˆ1
(C)⊕ E−1
Kˆ1
(C′) = ∆ .
(b) If so, let Kˆ2 = E
−1
Kˆ1
(C)⊕ E
Kˆ1
(M) and validate the guessed key Kˆ1‖Kˆ2 on all
pairs of L.
4. If the guessed key is validated, return (the consistent key) Kˆ1‖Kˆ2.
According to [38], we know that any block cipher E′ of key length k+ l bits is expected
to provide the following security against generic related-key attacks:
Advkr-rkaΦ,E′ (A) ≤ mt
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
,
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where m denotes the number of calls to the related-key oracle and t the number of
verifications. Interestingly, in a way similar to the analysis of the previous attack,
we get that, for m = 1, the success probability of our differential related-key attack
(DRKA) satisfies
Advkr-rkaE′ (DRKA) =
t
2k
>
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
.
Again, we conclude that the block-cipher based construct of Fig. 1-A does not offer the
best possible security against key recovery, in this case, in the presence of related-key
oracles.
5.2 Construction B
Lucks [29] argued that Theorem 3 only applies for large l. For practical values of l, one
may have that Advprp-rkaΦ,E′ (A)−AdvprpE (BA) is not negligible. He therefore considered
a construction that yields a more meaningful security bound. See Fig. 1-B.
Theorem 4 (Lucks) Let E : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher. Let E′ :
{0, 1}2l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be the block cipher defined as
E′K1‖K2(M) = EEK1 (K2)(M)
where K1 and K2 are l bits long. Let Φ be any set of RKD functions over {0, 1}k+l that
modify only K2 and that are independent of K1. Then, for any adversary A against
E′ that queries its related-key oracle with at most r different RKD transformations, we
can construct an adversary BA against E such that
Advprp-rkaΦ,E′ (A)
r + 1
≤ AdvprpE (BA) .
and BA makes no more oracle queries than A and runs in the same running time as
A. uunionsq
The encryption of key K2 under key K1 is used as the final secret key to encrypt
the plaintext M , i.e., C = EEK1 (K2)
(M). Further, note that although a 2l-bit key
K1‖K2 is used, essentially the adversary just needs to recover the final l-bit secret key
K˜ := EK1(K2) that is used to key the encryption of M , which reduces the exhaustive
key search space to l bits. For an attacker performing an exhaustive search (XS) on K˜,
we therefore have
AdvkrE′(XS) =
t
2l
=
t
2k
,
where t denotes the number of guessed keys (note that in this construction, k = l).
This has to be compared with the security bound given by a generic KR adversary
against a 2l-bit key cipher E′′:
AdvkrE′′(A) ≤ t
22l
+
1
22l − t =
t
22k
+
1
22k − t .
We see that the above XS attacker has a substantially larger success probability, and
the effective keyspace is halved.
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5.3 Construction C
Recall that DESX [21] is defined as:
DESX(M,K1‖K‖K2) = K2 ⊕ EK(M ⊕K1)
where K1 and K2 are the pre- and post-whitening keys, respectively, and K is the key
to the inner E encapsulated by the two outer whitening (XOR) operations. The basic
structure of Construction C is like DESX [21] except that the pre- and post-whitening
keys equal each other and is the result of applying an ²-AXU2 hash function h to the
input tweak T , K1 = K2 = h(T ) :
E′K‖T,h(M) = h(T )⊕ EK(M ⊕ h(T )).
In other words, this construction can be viewed as 2-key DESX where the secret key
is equivalently K and h(T ), thus the total key length is |K|+ |h(T )|, i.e. k + l.
This construction, by design, and hence its security proof in Proposition 1, restricts
that the set of RKD functions Φ defining an RKA adversary only modifies the input T
and not the input K to EK(·); this is similar to the RKD-restricting design approach
of Constructions A and B.
An advanced slide attack [10] was applied to DESX. It is basically an MITM attack.
We show that a variant also applies here.
MITM Attack. We first make some observations. Consider a pair of plaintexts M and
M ′ such that the corresponding ciphertexts, C and C′, satisfy the relation C ⊕ C′ =
h(T ). Such a pair is called a slid pair. For such a slid pair 〈M,C〉 and 〈M ′, C′〉, we
have
C = C′ ⊕ h(T ) = EK
(
M ′ ⊕ h(T )) and C′ = C ⊕ h(T ) = EK(M ⊕ h(T ))
which yields
E−1K (C)⊕M = E−1K (C′)⊕M ′ .
Based on this, we can mount the following attack.
1. Let L = 〈Mi, Ci〉1≤i≤p be a list of p known pairs of plaintext/ciphertext with,
Ci = E
′
K‖T,h(Mi).
2. For each key guess, Kˆ ∈ {0, 1}k, do the following.
(a) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ p, evaluate E−1
Kˆ
(Ci)⊕Mi and insert
〈E−1
Kˆ
(Ci)⊕Mi, i〉
into a hash table keyed by the first component, and check whether there is a
coincidence (collision) in the table.
(b) If so, assuming that the collision occurs for indexes i and j, namely, E−1
Kˆ
(Ci)⊕
Mi = E
−1
Kˆ
(Cj)⊕Mj , let h(Tˆ ) = Ci⊕Cj and validate the guessed key Kˆ‖h(Tˆ )
on all pairs of L.
3. If the guessed key is validated, return (the consistent key) Kˆ‖h(Tˆ ).
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The probability to have at least one coincidence (i.e., to find at least one slid pair
〈Mi, Ci〉 and 〈Mj , Cj〉 in L) is about
1− exp(−p2/2l+1) with p = |L|
due to the birthday paradox.
As a result, if t/2k denotes the proportion of keys guessed at Step 2, the success
probability of our MITM attacker is
AdvkrE′(MITM) ≈ t
2k
(
1− exp(−p2/2l+1)
)
.
More precisely, when the cardinality p of the plaintext/ciphertext list is square-root of
the entire plaintext space, i.e. p = 2(l+1)/2, then this MITM attack gives the adversarial
advantage
AdvkrE′(MITM) = O
(
t
2k
)
>
t
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
.
Thus, the MITM applies to this construction when the adversary has access to a signif-
icantly large plaintext/ciphertext list, of cardinality p ≥ 2(l+1)/2. Further discussions
of this in comparison with other constructions are given in subsection 5.4.
Resistance against RKA. We consider whether allowing the adversary extra access to
a related-key oracle would cause an attack better than bruteforce. To do so, we need
to exploit the related-key oracle to our advantage. The related-key oracle, by design of
the Construction C only allows variation to T , thus related-key differences can only be
induced with the T input via the function h(·). If with non-negligible probability an
input difference ∆T = T ⊕ T ′ leads to an output difference ∆H = h(T )⊕ h(T ′), then
one could choose two plaintexts m and m′ = m⊕∆H such that a zero input difference
goes into the underlying cipher EK (a non-zero difference does not propagate to any
non-negligibly observable property at the output since EK is a secure block cipher),
and a ciphertext difference C⊕C′ = ∆H is obtained. This could give a distinguisher for
the construction but does not lead to key recovery. However, h(·) by design is ²-AXU2,
therefore
Pr[h(T )⊕ h(T ′) = ∆H] ≤ ²
for all T, T ′,∆H so even this would not apply. A potential strategy to extend this to
key recovery is to consider message-input dependent differences [9] 〈∆T,∆Hi〉 through
h(·), where the space of possible output differences is partitioned into classes ∆Hi
dependent on the classes of input values Ti, so one can query the related-key oracle
with plaintext inputs mi = m ⊕ ∆Hi and expect that the ciphertext difference be
observed as ∆Hi only if the unknown input T falls within the class Ti. Once detected,
T can be searched (along with exhaustive guess of K) within the reduced space of Ti.
The notion of input (message/key) dependent differences [9,30] has been considered
for block ciphers; we leave open the question of whether input dependent differences
can be exploitable for ²-AXU2 hash functions. Meanwhile, the idea of exploiting many
small biases rather than confining to only one larger bias, was proposed in [37] as the
generalized (truncated) differential cryptanalysis technique.
The best known attack therefore remains to be the related-key meet-in-the-middle
attack over the keyspace [38]; more precisely the keyspace is reduced by the number
m of queries made to the related-key oracle, resulting in the success probability of
Advkr-rkaΦ,E′ (A) ≤ mt
2k+l
+
1
2k+l
.
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5.4 Discussions
Table 1 summarizes the KR and KR-RKA adversarial advantages for Constructions A,
B and C, contrasting between the expected (exp) advantage and the actual derived
advantage as a consequence of specific attacks.
Table 1 Comparing the Adversarial Advantages
Cipher Key Length exp Advkr(·) Advkr(·) exp Advkr-rka(·) Advkr-rka(·)
A k + l t
2k+l
+ 1
2k+l
MITM : t
2k
mt
2k+l
+ 1
2k+l
DRKA : t
2k
B 2l = 2k t
22l
+ 1
22l−t XS :
t
2l
mt
22l
+ 1
22l
−
C k + l t
2k+l
+ 1
2k+l
MITM : mt
2k+l
+ 1
2k+l
−
t
2k
(1− exp(−p2/2l+1))
In the KR case, attacks exist on Constructions A and B that reduce their security
effectively to the exhaustive search space over one (instead of both) key part. Construc-
tion C thus far fares better where its adversarial advantage is additionally a function
of the cardinality p of the plaintext/ciphertext list; whereas the specific attacks on
Constructions A and B work with only a pair of plaintext/ciphertexts. Having said
that, the attacks on Constructions A, B and C in previous subsections are the best
known attacks so far; it is open whether there are better attacks in future that close
this gap between the constructions.
In the KR-RKA case, a specific attack exists on Construction A; while it seems sim-
ilar attacks do not exist on the other constructions. For Construction B, this resistance
is derived from the fact that both key parts K1 and K2 are input to an underlying
cipher E before being input as a key to a subsequent application of the cipher E. This
way, assuming that the underlying cipher E is a good PRP, adversarial variations in
the key parts are not significantly observable at the output of E. For Construction C,
this resistance is similarly derived from the fact that the adversarial variation on key
part K enters a good underlying PRP cipher E, and that even if the input T to the
key part h(T ) is adversarially variable, the fact that h is ²-AXU2 means no significant
variation patterns will be observed at the output.
6 Relationships between Security Notions
In this section, we introduce indistinguishability and non-malleability based security
notions for the RKA setting that give more information on permutation families. We
also show the relations among these notions as well as relations with pseudorandomness
and tweakable counterparts.
We first give a definition of indistinguishability, which is the same as the left-or-right
security notion of Bellare et al. [1].
Definition 6 (TWEAK-IND) [13] Let E˜ : K×T ×D → D be a tweakable permutation
family and A be an adversary. Then the tweak-ind advantage of A is defined by
Advtweak-ind
E˜
(A) = Pr[K $← K : AE˜K(·,·)1,E˜−1K (·,·)1 = 1]
− Pr[K $← K : AE˜K(·,·)0,E˜−1K (·,·)0 = 1].
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AO˜(·,·)b,O˜−1(·,·)b (b = 0 or 1) means A with two oracles O˜(·, ·)b, O˜−1(·, ·)b; for an
adversary’s query of ((T0,M0), (T1,M1)) (resp. ((T0, C0), (T1, C1))) to the first (resp.
second) oracle it returns O˜(Tb,Mb) (resp. O˜−1(Tb, Cb)).
Similarly, the IND-RKA security notion can be defined as follows.
Definition 7 (IND-RKA) Let E : K × D → D be a permutation family and Φ be
a set of functions over K. Let A be an adversary that is restricted to queries within
Φ×D. Then the ind-rka advantage of A is defined by
Advind-rkaΦ,E (A) = Pr[K $← K : AERK(·,K)(·)
1,E−1
RK(·,K)(·)1 = 1]
− Pr[K $← K : AERK(·,K)(·)
0,E−1
RK(·,K)(·)0 = 1].
AORK(·)(·)
b,O−1
RK(·)(·)b (b = 0 or 1) means A with two oracles ORK(·)(·)b,O−1RK(·)(·)b;
for an adversary’s query of ((φ0,M0), (φ1,M1)) (resp. ((φ0, C0), (φ1, C1))) to the first
(resp. second) oracle it returns Oφb(K)(Mb) (resp. O−1φb(K)(Cb)).
Note that the TWEAK-IND adversary and the IND-RKA adversary should be dis-
allowed from asking queries that will allow it to win trivially. In the IND-RKA security
notion, when the IND-RKA adversary gets an answer C from the encryption oracle for
a query ((φ0,M0), (φ1,M1)), the adversary should be disallowed from asking queries
((φ0,M0), (·, ·)), or ((·, ·), (φ1,M1)) to the encryption oracle and queries ((φ0, C), (·, ·)),
or ((·, ·), (φ1, C)) to the decryption oracle, where (·, ·) represents an arbitrary argument.
The similar argument is applied when the IND-RKA adversary gets an answer M from
the decryption oracle for a query ((φ0, C0), (φ1, C1)). See [13] for the disallowed queries
of a tweak-ind adversary.
We now consider another security notion, non-malleability. In a tweakable permuta-
tion family E˜ : K×T ×D → D, a tweak-nm adversary A is given access to an encrypting
oracle E˜K(·, ·) and a decrypting oracle E˜−1K (·, ·) where K is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from the set of keys K. In order to define the advantage of a tweak-nm adversary
A we need definitions of the following three sets.
– M(T ) : a set of all M such that A asks E˜K(·, ·) to encrypt (T,M) or A asks
E˜−1K (·, ·) to decrypt (T,C) and its answer is M .
– C(T ) : a set of all C such that A asks E˜−1K (·, ·) to decrypt (T,C) or A asks E˜K(·, ·)
to encrypt (T,M) and its answer is C.
– M(T,C) : a set {E˜−1K (T,C)} if C ∈ C(T ), and a set D \M(T ) otherwise.
Definition 8 (TWEAK-NM) [13] Let E˜ : K×T ×D → D be a tweakable permutation
family and A be an adversary. Then the tweak-nm advantage of A is defined by
Advtweak-nm
E˜
(A) = Pr[K $← K, (T,C, f) $← AE˜K(·,·),E˜−1K (·,·),M = E˜−1K (T,C) : f(M) = 1]
− Pr[K $← K, (T,C, f) $← AE˜K(·,·),E˜−1K (·,·),M $←M(T,C) : f(M) = 1].
The function f is the encoding of a predicate f : D → {0, 1}.
Similarly, we can define non-malleability of a permutation family E : K × D → D
against related-key attacks. In related-key attack models, an NM-RKA adversary A is
given access to an encrypting oracle ERK(·,K)(·) and a decrypting oracle E−1RK(·,K)(·)
where K is chosen uniformly at random from the set of keys K. In these attack models,
A is restricted to queries of the form (φ, x) in which φ is in a certain set of key
transformations Φ and x is in D. The three sets are defined as follows.
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– M(φ) : a set of all M such that A asks ERK(·,K)(·) to encrypt (φ,M) or A asks
E−1
RK(·,K)(·) to decrypt (φ,C) and its answer is M .
– C(φ) : a set of all C such that A asks E−1
RK(·,K)(·) to decrypt (φ,C) or A asks
ERK(·,K)(·) to encrypt (φ,M) and its answer is C.
– M(φ,C) : a set {E−1
φ(K)
(C)} if C ∈ C(φ), and a set D \M(φ) otherwise.
Definition 9 (NM-RKA) Let E : K×D → D be a permutation family and Φ be a set
of functions over K. Let A be an adversary that is restricted to queries within Φ×D.
Then the nm-rka advantage of A is defined by
Advnm-rkaΦ,E (A) = Pr[K $← K, (φ,C, f) $← A
ERK(·,K)(·),E−1RK(·,K)(·),M = E−1
φ(K)
(C) : f(M) = 1]
− Pr[K $← K, (φ,C, f) $← AERK(·,K)(·),E
−1
RK(·,K)(·),M $←M(φ,C) : f(M) = 1].
The function f is the encoding of a predicate f : D → {0, 1}.
The following three theorems clarify the relationships between these newly defined
security notions IND-RKA, NM-RKA and the SPRP-RKA security notion. Theorem 5
shows that SPRP-RKA security implies IND-RKA security and Theorem 6 shows the
converse. Theorem 7 shows that SPRP-RKA security implies NM-RKA security. The
proofs of Theorems 5, 6 and 7 are similar to the proofs of [13], so we omit them.
Theorem 5 (SPRP-RKA→IND-RKA) Let E : K × D → D be a permutation family
and Φ be a set of functions over K. If E is secure in the sense of SPRP-RKA restricted
to Φ, then E is also secure in the sense of IND-RKA restricted the Φ. Formally, given
a Φ-restricted IND-RKA adversary A that queries its oracles with at most q queries, we
can construct a Φ-restricted SPRP-RKA adversary BA such that
Advind-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ 2 ·Advsprp-rkaΦ,E (BA) +
2 · q2
|D| − q
and BA takes almost same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.5
Theorem 6 (IND-RKA→SPRP-RKA) Let E : K × D → D be a permutation family
and Φ be a set of functions over K. If E is secure in the sense of IND-RKA restricted
to Φ, then E is also secure in the sense of SPRP-RKA restricted the Φ. Formally, given
a Φ-restricted SPRP-RKA adversary A that queries its oracles with at most q queries,
we can construct a Φ-restricted IND-RKA adversary BA such that
Advsprp-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ Advind-rkaΦ,E (BA)
and BA takes almost same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.
5 BA takes a slightly higher time than A, as the main loop of BA is A; before performing
A, BA conducts a certain preparation for the use of A, and after performing A, BA outputs
either 0 or 1, which both require a small time complexity. In the following theorems, the same
statement is applied.
19
Theorem 7 (SPRP-RKA→NM-RKA) Let E : K × D → D be a permutation family
and Φ be a set of functions over K. If E is secure in the sense of SPRP-RKA restricted
to Φ, then E is also secure in the sense of NM-RKA restricted the Φ. Formally, given
a Φ-restricted NM-RKA adversary A that queries its oracles with at most q queries, we
can construct a Φ-restricted SPRP-RKA adversary BA such that
Advnm-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ Advsprp-rkaΦ,E (BA)
and BA takes almost same amount of time as A and makes one more query than A.
The following two theorems show that secure TWEAK-IND (resp. TWEAK-NM)
families can be transformed into secure IND-RKA (resp. NM-RKA) families.
Theorem 8 (TWEAK-IND→IND-RKA) Let E˜ : K × T × D → D be a tweakable
permutation family and let E : (K×T )×D → D be a permutation family defined as in
Theorem 1. If E˜ is secure in the sense of TWEAK-IND, then E is secure in the sense of
IND-RKA restricted to Φ if each function φ ∈ Φ is a partial transformation for which
there exists a function φ′ : T → T such that φ(K,T ) = (K,φ′(T )). Formally, given
a Φ-restricted IND-RKA adversary A attacking E, we can construct a TWEAK-IND
adversary BA attacking E˜ such that
Advind-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ Advtweak-indE˜ (BA)
and BA takes the same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.
Proof Let BA be the E˜ adversary that works as follows.
<Adversary BO˜(·,·)
b,O˜−1(·,·)b
A >
1. Select T at random from T .
2. Obtain A’s request ((φ0,M0), (φ1,M1)) (or ((φ0, C0), (φ1, C1))) by running A,
where φ0 = (id, φ
′
0) and φ1 = (id, φ
′
1).
3. Return O˜(φ′b(T ),Mb) (or O˜−1(φ′b(T ), Cb)) to A.
4. If A outputs b′, then output b′. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Since the adversary BA is given access to E˜K(·, ·)b, E˜−1K (·, ·)b where K is randomly
chosen from K, BA computes ERK(·,K||T )(·)b, E−1RK(·,K||T )(·)b by running A. So the
equality
Pr [K
$← K : BE˜K(·,·)
b,E˜−1K (·,·)b
A = 1] =
Pr [K
$← K, T $← T : AERK(·,K||T )(·)
b,E−1
RK(·,K||T )(·)b = 1]
holds. This completes the proof. ¤
Theorem 9 (TWEAK-NM→NM-RKA) Let E˜ : K × T × D → D be a tweakable
permutation family and let E : (K×T )×D → D be a permutation family defined as in
Theorem 1. If E˜ is secure in the sense of TWEAK-NM, then E is secure in the sense
of NM-RKA restricted to Φ if each function φ ∈ Φ is a partial transformation for which
there exists a function φ′ : T → T such that φ(K,T ) = (K,φ′(T )). Formally, given
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a Φ-restricted NM-RKA adversary A attacking E, we can construct a TWEAK-NM
adversary BA attacking E˜ such that
Advnm-rkaΦ,E (A) ≤ Advtweak-nmE˜ (BA)
and BA takes the same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries
as A.
Proof Let BA be the E˜ adversary that works as follows.
<Adversary BO˜(·,·),O˜
−1(·,·)
A >
1. Select T at random from T .
2. Obtain A’s request (φ∗(= (id, φ′∗)),M∗) (or (φ∗(= (id, φ′∗)), C∗)) by running A.
3. Return O˜(φ′∗(T ),M∗) (or O˜−1(φ′∗(T ), C∗)) to A.
4. If A outputs (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f), then output (φ′(T ), C, f). Otherwise, go to Step
2.
Since the adversary BA is given access to E˜K(·, ·), E˜−1K (·, ·) where K is chosen
uniformly at random from K, BA computes ERK(·,K||T )(·), E−1RK(·,K||T )(·) by running
A. Based on Definition 9 we have
Adv tweak−nm
E˜
(BA) =
Pr [K
$← K, T $← T , (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f) $← AERK(·,K||T )(·),E
−1
RK(·,K||T )(·),
M = E˜−1K (φ
′(T ), C) : f(M) = 1]
− Pr [K $← K, T $← T , (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f) $← AERK(·,K||T )(·),E
−1
RK(·,K||T )(·),
M
$←M(φ′(T ), C) : f(M) = 1].
Since f(E˜−1K (φ
′(T ), C)) = 1 if and only if f(E−1
K||φ′(T )(C)) = 1, the equality
Pr [K
$← K, T $← T , (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f) $← AERK(·,K||T )(·),E
−1
RK(·,K||T )(·),
M = E˜−1K (φ
′(T ), C) : f(M) = 1]
= Pr [K
$← K, T $← T , (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f) $← AERK(·,K||T )(·),E
−1
RK(·,K||T )(·),
M = E−1
K||φ′(T )(C) : f(M) = 1]
holds. Furthermore, for all φ = (id, φ′) and C, M(φ′(T ), C) of BA takes the same
distribution with M(φ,C) of A (this is because the output of BA is based on the
output of A) and thus the equation
Pr [K
$← K, T $← T , (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f) $← AERK(·,K||T )(·),E
−1
RK(·,K||T )(·),
M
$←M(φ′(T ), C) : f(M) = 1]
= Pr [K
$← K, T $← T , (φ(= (id, φ′)), C, f) $← AERK(·,K||T )(·),E
−1
RK(·,K||T )(·),
M
$←M(φ,C) : f(M) = 1]
holds. This completes the proof. ¤
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7 Conclusions
We have presented an SPRP block cipher construction that is secure against related-key
attacks (with respect to some set of related keys) built from a tweakable SPRP, which
is the most efficient to date. We have also improved a bound for the PRF-RKA/PRP-
RKA switching proposition, which provides a tighter security bound for constructing
PRP-RKA ciphers from PRF of a certain form. Furthermore, we have presented several
key recovery attacks on all known PRP-RKA secure ciphers. Finally, we have defined
various RKA security notions and showed their relations. The results obtained from
this paper can stimulate the design and analysis of SPRP or PRP constructions that
are secure against related-key attacks, and of a broader perspective stimulate the study
of provable security of block ciphers.
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A Theorem 2 of [27]
Let E : K × D → D be a permutation family, let H : T → D be an ²-AXU2 family with
² ≥ 1/|D| and let E′ : (K × T × H) × D → D be another permutation family defined as
E′K,T,h(M) = EK(M ⊕ h(T ))⊕ h(T ) where (K,h) is a secret key in K×H, T is a tweak in T
and M is a message in D. If E is a secure SPRP and H is ²-AXU2 where ² is negligible, then
E′ is a secure TWEAK-SPRP. Formally, given a TWEAK-SPRP adversary A attacking E′ that
queries its oracles with at most q queries, we can construct a SPRP adversary BA attacking E
such that
Advtweak-sprp
E′ (A) ≤ Adv
sprp
E (BA) + 3²q2
and BA takes the same amount of time and makes the same number of oracle queries as A.
